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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RELIABLE FURNITURE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN HOME 
ASSURANCE CO., WESTERN 
GENERAL AGENCY, and 
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT 
BUREAU, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11656 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the District 
Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, dis-
missing, as a matter of law, the appellant's case 
against all defendants after presentation of the evi-
dence by plaintiff-appellant. Findings and a formal 
judgment were filed on April 28, 1969 (R 34-36). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff originally filed its action in the Dis-
trict Court, Third Judicial District against Fidelity 
and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., Amer-
ican Home Assurance Company, Western General 
Agency and General Adjustment Bureau. Subse-
quently, Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Under-
writers, Inc. was dismissed from the action and the 
1 
dismissal was affirmed by this court in Reliabile Fur-
niture Co. vs. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Un-
derwriters, Inc. 14 U. 2d 169, 380 P 2d 135 (1963). 
On pre-trial in the instant action, the respondent's 
motions to dismiss each of the remaining parties de-
fendant was granted; however, on appeal to this 
Court that decision was reversed. Reliable Furniture 
Co. vs. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwrit-
ers, Inc. 16 U. 2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685 ( 1965). There 
after an amended complaint was filed by the plain-
tiff adding a cause of action sounding in fraud and 
the case was set for jury trial. After presentation of 
the appellant's evidence, the Honorable D. F. Wilkins, 
Judge, granted respondent's motion for an involun-
tary non-suit under Rule 41-b Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents contend that the decision of the 
District Court dismissing appellant's cause of action 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Reliable Furniture Company (here-
inafter ref erred to as "Reliable") is a Utah corpora-
tion which has conducted furniture operations in the 
State of Utah. The corporation is primarily owned by 
Mr. Sam Herscovitz and his wife, with Mr. Hersco-
vitz in complete control (R 55-56, 64). On March 30, 
1961, shortly after Mr. Herscovitz arrived at the Re-
liable store in Ogden, a fire occurred which destroyed 
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a portion of the building and a portion of the Reliable 
inventory (R 72-76). 
At the time of the fire, Reliable was a named 
insured under two separate policies of fire insurance. 
One policy was issued by Fidelity and Guaranty In-
surance Underwriters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to 
as "F&G") and insured Reliable against loss by fire 
to its stock and inventory. The second policy was is-
sued by American Home Assurance Company (here-
inafter referred to as "American") and it insured 
Reliable against business interruption loss (Exhibit 
P-2). 
Following the loss, Wes tern General Agency 
(hereinafter referred to as "Western") requested 
Mr. William J. Holmes, an independent insurance 
agent in Ogden, to assign the loss to the General Ad-
justment Bureau, an independent adjustment com-
pany (hereinafter referred to as "GAB"). Western 
is an insurance services agency providing general 
services to insurance agencies in the Utah area (R 
245) ( R 196). Mr. William Ball of the GAB was giv-
en the assignment. The GAB's function was to inves-
tigate and determine the amount of loss and to file 
a report with the company from whom it received its 
assignment (R 204, 258). The GAB had no part in 
determining when, or even if, payment would be 
made (R 204, 258). Mr. Herscovitz testified that he 
knew that Mr. Ball's only duty in connection with this 
loss was the mathematics and that Mr. Ball had noth-
ing to do with payment (R 159, 167-168). 
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In the course of investigations seeking to deter-
mine the extent of loss under both policies, Mr. Ball 
advised Mr. Herscovitz that he should not be in a hur-
ry to settle the business interruption loss. Mr. Hers-
covitz concurred in this advice and was not desirous 
of adjusting the business interruption loss at an early 
date (R 88, 100, 139, 162). He was only anxious to 
obtain the proceeds of the inventory loss (R 94) and, 
after the completion of the investigation of the inven-
tory loss, a proof of loss in relation to the inventory 
loss was signed by Mr. Herscovitz on or about May 
7, 1961 and forwarded to F & G (R 158). 
On June 16, 1961, Mr. Day, for the first time re-
ceived authority from F & G to pay the inventory loss 
in the amount of $84,923.39 (R 249). Western had 
no authority to pay claims in this amount and such 
authority could only be given by the insurance com-
pany ( R 254). Because of the absence of a required 
co-signer on June 16, 1961, the $84,823.39 check was 
not delivered to Mr. Herscovitz, but an appointment 
was made for a meeting in the Reliable office in Og-
den on Monday, June 19, 1961, for the purpose of de-
livering the check and seeking to adjust the business 
interruption loss (R 249, 250). 
For approximately two hours in the afternoon of 
June 19, 1961, Mr. Ball worked with the books and 
records of Reliable, working during part of this time 
with Wayne Dykstra, Reliable's bookkeeper (R 136, 
209, 216, 217). At the conclusion of this investiga-
tion Mr. Ball advised Mr. Herscovitz that he comput-
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ed the business interrruption loss to be in the amount 
of $12,609.39, although Mr. Ball had advised Mr. 
Dykstra that he thought the loss should be substan-
tially lower ( R 217-218). There was substantial 
dispute between Mr. Ball and Reliable's personnel 
concerning the period of prior business activity to be 
used in computing the business interruption loss. Re-
liable had suffered losses in the amount of $63,149.73 
in the fiscal year of 1960 and business had been in re-
verse since April 1960 (R. 142-143). Mr. Herscovitz 
wanted Mr. Ball to use years other than 1960 because 
of this loss pattern (R 165-166). Mr. Herscovitz 
himself filed a proof of loss on June 15, 1961 in which 
he claimed a loss of $48,386.00; in the original com-
plaint the loss was claimed to be $40,776.61; subse-
quently it was raised to $70,000.00 and now it is 
claimed that the loss was in the area of $128,000.00 
(R 151-152); Exhibit D-9, Appellant's Brief p.13). 
Both Mi·. Dykstra and Mr. Herscovitz believed 
the loss to be greater and expressed this to Mr. Day 
and Mr. Ball (R 210). According to Mr. Herscovitz 
he then demanded payment of the inventory loss (R 
100). In response to this demand, Mr. Herscovitz 
testified that Mr. Day said that there would be no 
payment on the inventory loss until Mr. Herscovitz 
signed the proof of loss in the amount of $12,609.39 
( R 100). When asked the alternatives to his failure 
to sign the proof of loss relating to the business inter-
ruption loss, Mr. Day stated, "arbitration on both 
claims or suit in Court" (R 101). Mr. Herscovitz 
5 
turned to Mr. Ball and asked him if that was the way 
it had to be and Mr. Ball said, "Yes, that's the way .li; 
has to be" (R 101). This statement was the only 
participation by Mr. Ball in the entire conversation 
between Mr. Day and Mr. Herscovitz and it was stat-
ed in a soft mumble and at a time when Mr. Hersco-
vitz knew that Mr. Ball had no connection with the 
payment of the loss (R 163, 168).FN/ 
At this same meeting on June 19, 1961, Mr. 
Herscovitz signed the proof of loss for the business 
interruption loss in the amount of $12,609.39 (Ex-
hibit D-13) and received two separate drafts; one 
drawn on the account of F & Gin the amount of $84,-
923.39 covering the loss of inventory, (hereinafter 
referred to as "F & G draft") and one drawn on the 
account of American in the amount of $12,609.39 for 
business interruption loss, hereinafter referred to as 
the "American draft" ('R 102, 104). The Ameri-
can draft contained the following language on the 
face of the draft: "In full settlement of Business In-
terruption Coverage", and on the reverse side it con-
tained, in part, the following: "Endorsement by 
payee constitutes a receipt and release for the items 
mentioned on the face of this check" (Exhibit D-12). 
The proof of loss signed by Mr. Herscovitz contained 
no language of release and Mr. Herscovitz so under-
FN/ Mr. Dykstra had no specific recollection of this statement; Mr. 
Day denied that any of this conversation ever occurred (R 210-
211, 256). However, for purposes of this appeal, we have stated 
only those facts which are most favorable to Mr. Herscovitz's 
version of this meeting. 
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stood that the signing of the proof of loss did not af-
fect his rights (R 153, Exhibit D-13). He signed it 
only so he could collect the F & G draft ( R 154). 
On June 20, 1961, Mr. Herscovitz instructed Mr. 
Dykstra to deposit the F & G draft in the Reliable 
account and instructed him not to deposit the Amer-
ican draft (R 213). Prior to that time Mr. Hersco-
vitz had contacted Mr. Holmes and on June 20, 1961 
contacted an attorney, Mr. Spooner, for the specific 
purpose of discussing the events of June 19th with 
him (R 105-106, 139). Mr. Herscovitz took no fur-
ther action until he had actually collected into the 
Reliable account the proceeds of the F & G draft. Af-
ter ascertaining that these proceeds had been collect-
ed, he then endorsed the American draft and deposit-
ed it for collection (R 106,141, 154). Shortly after 
receiving the benefits from the American draft, Re-




Appellant appeals from the trial court's deter-
mination dismissing its action against all three de-
fendants. In analyzing the correctness of this deter-
mination it is imperative to first establish the legal 
theories advanced by appellant against each defen-
dant. First as against American, plaintiff seeks to 
recover for its alleged business interruption loss un-
der the provision of the American policy (R 31-33). 
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In so doing it seeks to set aside the effect of the settle-
ment evidenced by the language found on the Amer-
ican draft, asserting that it was the result of fraud 
and duress. Second, as against American, Western 
and GAB it seeks to recover for damages allegedly 
caused by the alleged fraud of Mr. Day and Mr. Ball, 
which it asserts caused it to enter into the above men-
tioned settlement. Appellant also apperently seeks to 
claim redress from all three defendants for dam-
ages allegedly arising from the alleged fraudulent 
and coercive conduct of Mr. Day and Mr. Ball ( R 22-
28) .FN; What distinction can be drawn between the 
alleged misrepresentations in the Third Cause of Ac-
tion and the allegation of fraud and coercion in the 
First and Second Causes of Action is difficult to 
ascertain. It would appear to relate to the same con-
duct. 
Distilled to their essence, all of the allegations 
of the complaint hinge on appellant's assertion that 
it was coerced into accepting a settlement in the 
amount of $12,609.39 for its business interruption 
loss as a condition for its receipt of $84,923.39 for the 
inventory loss. Inability to support this crucial asser-
tion would result in the failure of all of the causes 
of action. After the presentation of appellant's case-
in-chief it was clear that there was no evidence to 
support this assertion and no evidence which would 
have justified a trier of fact in returning a verdict 
for appellant against any defendant. 
FN/ Neither Mr. Day or Mr. Ball as individuals are parties to this 
action. 
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First, there was absolutely no evidence that ap-
pellant entered into a settlement of the business in-
terrruption loss as a result of economic duress. In 
fact the evidence was just to the contrary; he endors-
ed the American draft and obtained the proceeds 
after he had collected the proceeds from the inventory 
loss. Second, there was absolutely no evidence that 
appellant relied on any representation of Mr. Day or 
Mr. Ball. Again, the evidence was just to the con-
trary; Mr. Herscovitz knew they couldn't compel him 
to sign a release to obtain the proceeds of the inven-
tory loss and he consulted with counsel before en-
dorsing the draft. Third, there was absolutely no evi-
dence that any of the alleged representation and coer-
cive conduct was authorized by American, Western 
or GAB or that such conduct was within the scope of 
the resnonsibilities of either Mr. Day or Mr. Ball. 
Particularly, as to the GAB, Mr. Herscovitz testified 
th::it he knew it had nothing to do with payment. 
We respectfully submit that when confronted 
with this complete lack of evidence supporting any 
of its contentions, the trial judge was legally required 
to dismiss this action. 
When this matter was before this court for re-
view in Reliable vs. Fidelity and Guaranty Insiirance 
Underwriters, Inc. 16 U 2d 211398 P 2d 685 (1965) 
only the bare pleadings and a transcript of pre-trial 
proceedings were before the Court. Thus, appellant's 
reliance on that holding is misplaced. The trial judge 
rlid exactly what this Court held it should do - give 
9 
appellant an opportunity to present all its evidence. 
This was done and it was properly found to be legally 
insufficient. Additionally, a:t the time this matter 
was before this Court the American draft, def en-
dant's Exhibit D-12 was not in evidence. It is this Ex-
hibit endorsed after the collection of the F & G draft, 
which contains the language of settlement and re-
lease, not the document of June 19, 1961, which ap-
pellant asserts that he signed only because he wanted 
to get the F & G draft. Such assertion has no applica-
bility to the endorsement of the American draft. 
POINT II 
THE ACTION OF SAM HERSCOVITZ IN NE-
GOTIATING THE AMERICAN DRAFT CON-
STITUTED A FULL AND FIN AL SETTLE-
MENT OF THE BUSINESS INTERRUPTION 
CLAIM AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
THAT TT WAS THE RESULT OF FRAUD OR 
DURESS. 
The evidence in this case demonstrates beyond 
peradventure that there was a dispute between Mr. 
Ball and Mr. Herscovitz as to the amount of the busi-
ness interruption loss (R 217-218). Mr. Ball believ-
ed that it should have been substantially less than 
$12,000.00; Mr. Herscovitz believed it should have 
been much higher. See supra pg. 5. If the dispute 
could not be resolved the policy provided for a method 
of resolution upon demand of either party (Exhibit 
P-2). Mr. Herscovitz was familiar with this provi-
sion ( R 155), but never made any such demand eith-
er before or after he had collected the funds from the 
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F & G draft. In addition, there was a question as to 
whether or not any amount was due under the policy 
because of the suspicious nature of the origin of the 
fire ( R 249). Thus, at no time prior to the prepara-
tion of its draft on June 19, 1961, did American agree 
to any settlement. The preparation of the various 
proofs of loss by appellant, either on the 15th of June 
or the 19th of June did not constitute an agreement 
by American to pay anything, they were merely 
claims by the insured as to what he believed his loss 
to be. 
On its face the American draft provided that it 
was "in full settlement" and it provided on the re-
verse side that endorsement constituted "a receipt 
and release". There would appear to be no dispute 
that Mr. Herscovitz was aware of these provisions at 
the time he endorsed the draft and, in fact, beside 
consulting an attorney, was himself a law school grad-
uate (R 54). We submit that in these circumstances, 
Reliable is bound by the clear language on the draft 
and the negotiation of the American draft constitut-
ed acceptance of the conditions of payment. Any oth-
er result would be contrary to public policy and well 
established legal principles. Mr. Herscovitz at the 
time of endorsement and collection was free to reject 
these conditions; he chose not to. American was under 
no obligation to make any payment until there was 
an agreement between it and the insured as to the 
amount of loss and a determination as to coverage. 
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In the spirit of compromise it made its offer, appel-
lant accepted this offer and should be bound thereby. 
The general rule is stated in 1 Am. Jr. 2d, Ac-
cord and Satisfaction, Section 18: 
"A creditor to whom remittance is made 
as payment in full of an unliquidated or dis-
puted claim has the option either of accepting 
it upon the condition on which it was sent or of 
rejecting it, and if it clearly appears that the 
remittance was sent upon the condition that 
it be accepted in full satisfaction, then failure 
to reject it will result in an accord and satis-
faction. This, acceptance and use of a check 
purporting to be 'in full' or employing words 
of similar import, or accompanied by a letter 
to that effect, amounts to an accord and satis-
faction of the larger claim of the creditor if 
that claim is unliquidated or disputed. The 
moment the creditor indorses and collects the 
check with knowledge that it is offered in full 
satisfaction of a disputed claim, he thereby 
agrees to the condition and is estopped from 
denying such agreement. It is then that the 
minds of the parties meet and the contract of 
accord and satisfaction becomes complete. It 
is not necessary to show that the creditor knows 
the legal effect of his acceptance of the check, 
and his intent in accepting the check is imma-
terial, since the mere acceptance will be re-
garded as assent." 
This court has adopted with approval the above 
quote and stated that acceptance of a check operates 
as a full discharge when "the condition that it is to be 
accepted in full satisfaction of the pending claim or 
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obligation . . . (is) expressly made." Hintze vs. Se-
aich, 20 U. 2d 275, 437 P 2d 202, 207 (1968). As 
noted above the draft tendered to Mr. Herscovitz and ' later negotiated by him, contained such an express 
condition. 
The legal effect of the endorsement is not vitiat-
ed by the fact that Mr. Herscovitz disputed the a-
mount due or that he was accepting the claim in full 
satisfaction. In 75 ALR, 905, 916, it is noted: 
"Generally, where the amount due is un-
liquidated or disputed, and a remittance of an 
amount less than that claimed is sent to the 
creditor, together with a statement that it is in 
full satisfaction of the claim, and the tender is 
accompanied by such acts or declarations as 
amount to a condition that, if the remittance 
is accepted in full satisfaction of the disputed 
claim, and the creditor is aware of such condi-
tions, the acceptance of such remittance con-
stitutes an accord and satisfaction, although 
the creditor protests at the time that the a-
mount tendered is not accepted in full satis-
f actwn." (Emphasis added). 
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 420 observes: 
·"Acceptance by a creditor of any perfor-
mance tendered by the debtor as satisfaction 
of a pre-existing contractual duty, or of a duty 
to make compensation, is not prevented from 
operating as satisfaction by the creditor's 
manifested refusal to regard it." 
See also the illustrations and comment under said 
Section. 
Appellant may not argue that payment of the 
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$12,609.39 draft was a payment of an admitted part 
due and therefore not a complete settlement. In Wil-
leston, Contracts, 3d Ed. Section 129, it is stated: 
"Not infrequently, though a claim is un-
liquidated or the subject of a bona fide and rea-
sonable dispute, it is conceded that at least a 
certain amount is due. While it would appear 
that in paying this conceded part of the claim, 
the debtor was merely doing what he was pre-
viously bound to do, the law looks upon an un-
liquidated or disputed claim as a whole and 
does not attempt to set a value upon it, or to de-
fine the extent of the debtor's legal obligation. 
Accordingly, such a claim is dealt with as a 
chattel is dealt with, as something the ade-
quacy of which as consideration will not be 
measured. By the weight of authority, the pay-
ment of the amount admittedly due will sup-
port a promise to discharge the whole claim. 
Whether such payment is made by check or 
otherwise is immaterial." 
In any event, in the case at bar, this was a dis-
puted claim with no admission by American that any 
amount was due and owing on June 19, 1961, or at 
the time of endorsement. 
Nor should Appellant be heard to claim that the 
endorsement was void because it was the result of any 
fraud, duress or coercion existing at that time. The 
only duress testified to by appellant's president was 
the need for the inventory loss payment (R 94, 
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153) .FN; These funds had been collected by appellant 
prior to the endorsement of the American draft so the 
duress, if any, was alleviated. At no time during the 
trial was Appellant able to articulate any theory of 
fraud, duress or coercion which influenced his deci-
sion to endorse the draft and collect the funds. 
In comparable cases where duress may have ex-
isted, but ended before the execution of the release, 
the courts have barred recovery. Gottleib vs. Charles 
Scribner Sons, 232 Ala. 33, 166 So. 685 ( 1936) ; Kall 
vs. W. G. Block Co., 319 Ill. 339, 150 N.E. 254 (1926); 
Ashland Coal and Coke Company vs. Old Ben Coal 
Corporation, 187 Atl. 596 (Del. 1934); Neher vs. 
Kerr, 70 Ind. App. 363, 123 N.E. 467 (1919). 
We submit that when Appellant made a decision 
to endorse the American draft, he was fully aware of 
the consequences and he should not now be heard to 
complain. 
POINT III 
THE ACTION OF SAM HERSCOVITZ IN NE-
GOTIATING THE AMERICAN DRAFT IN SET-
TLEMENT OF THE BUSINESS INTERRUP-
TION CLAIM CONSTITUTED A RATIFICA-
TION OF THE EVENTS OF JUNE 19th. 
FN/ Typical of appellant's position was the following testimony of 
Mr. Herscovitz at page 153 of the reporters transcript: 
"Q. Mr. Herscovitz, so I understand this clearly, is your testi-
mony that the only reason you signed Defendant's Exhibit 
13 which is the Proof of Loss, agreeing to the amount of the 
was because Mr. Day said to you, 'If you don't sign this, 
you aren't going to get your $84,000.00' is that correct? 
"A. Absolutely correct." . 
Obviously, once the funds were collected the threat was meaningless. 
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Appellant argues that the trial court took the 
endorsed American draft out of context and that it 
should have reviewed the transaction as a whole. We 
submit that it is appellant who seeks to ignore the 
entire transaction and seeks only to focus on the al-
leged events of June 19, 1961. Typical of this attempt 
is the following language from appellants brief at 
page 7: 
"But the case Reliable presents to this 
Court is not a normal case. It is a case of fraud 
and duress compelling Reliable to accept a 
token settlement or face certain destruction 
from lack of funds." 
We believe it is fair to ask appellant a number of 
questions. What compelled it to endorse the American 
draft after collecting the $84,923.39? What compell-
ed it to endorse the American draft at all? What pre-
vented appellant from merely destroying the draft? 
What prevented appellant from placing the draft in 
an envelope and returning it to where it came? The 
answer to all these questions is obvious - nothing, 
except Mr. Herscovitz's desire to acquire "the $12,-
609.39 in [his] bank account." (R 155). 
We submit that even if one accepts Mr. Hersco-
vitz's testimony concerning the events of June 19, 
1961, his conduct in endorsing the American draft 
after the termination of any economic duress, dem-
onstrated that he was willing to abide by the settle-
ment of June 19, 1961 regardless of how that settle-
ment was achieved. 
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The general rule is stated in 77 A.L.R. 2d 427, 
428: 
"A contract entered into under duress is 
generally.considered not void, but merely void-
able and 1s capable of being ratified after the 
duress is removed, such ratification resulting 
if a party entering into the contract under 
duress intentionally accepts the benefits grow-
ing out of it, remains silent, acquiesces in it for 
any consirerable length of time after oppor-
tunity is afforded to void it or to have it an-
nulled, or recognizes its validity by acting on 
it." 
In this regard it should be emphasized again 
that Herscovitz consulted with counsel, was himself 
legally trained, and expressly made certain that the 
F & G draft had cleared and that he had the available 
cash on hand to continue to operate his business be-
fore endorsing the American draft. Having had the 
opportunity to escape from the claimed duress, and 
thereafter having endorsed the draft and accepted 
the fruits of the conduct which appellant contends 
was tantamount to duress, it is apparent that a rati-
fication occurred. In this regard, the case of State vs. 
Barlow, 107 Ut 292, 153 P 2d 647 (1944), is pertin-
ent where the Court stated: 
'''As a rule, in a transaction requiring 
mutual consent, if consent is obtained by coer-
cion the victim may either affirm or avoid the 
tran'saction, but he may not claim the benefits 
and escape the obligations." (P. 307) 
Implicit in the court's language is the conclusion 
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that accepting the benefits in the face of duress con-
stitutes ratification. 
In Farrington vs. Granite Stake Fire Insurance 
Co., 120 Ut. 109, 232 P 2d 754 ( 1951), the Court re-
jected the right of an insurance company to rescind 
for misrepresentation where the insurer knew of the 
facts a few days after a fire and accepted a premium 
payment knowing of the fire and did nothing "till 
suit was brought". The court noted : 
"One who claims a right of rescission 
must act with reasonable promptness, and if 
after such knowledge, he does any substantial 
act which recognizes the contract as in force, 
such as the acceptance of more than half of the 
premium would be, such an act would usually 
constitute a waiver of his right to rescind." 
(P. 119) 
The old addage of "What is sauce for the goose, 
is also sauce for the gander" is pertinent. 
In LeVine vs. Whitehouse, 37 Ut. 260, 109 Pac. 
2 ( 1910), the Court in considering the effect of fraud 
stated: 
"The rule is that, where a party has been 
induced to enter into a contract by false and 
fradulent representations, he may ... rescind 
the contract, but the great weight of authority 
holds that, if the party defrauded continues to 
receive benefits under the contract after he 
has become aware of the fraud, he will be deem-
ed to have affirmed the contract and waived 
his right to rescind." (P. 272) 
Of importance is the fact that the court accepted 
the following quote from 9 Cyc. 436 : 
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. '."The party. def_rauded will generally lose 
his right to rescmd if he takes any benefit un-
der or .does any act which implies 
an intention to abide by it or an affirmance 
of it after he has become aware of the fraud." 
(Emphasis added) 
The importance of the wording is the recogni-
tion of an intention or implication to affirm from the 
act of accepting the benefits. 
Subsequently, in the decision of Taylor vs. 
Moore, 87 Ut. 493, 51P2d 222 (1935), a case involv-
ing fraud (and it should be remembered that this 
court in the instant case used the word fraud), the 
Utah Supreme Court approved the following quote 
from the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Shappirio vs. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232 ( 1904): 
" 'He cannot ... treat the property as his 
own and exercise acts of ownership over it 
which shows an election to regard the same as 
his, and at the same time preserve his right to 
rescission (sic.)'." 
In M cKellar Real Estate & Investment Co. vs. 
Paxton, 62 Ut. 97, 218 Pac. 128 (1923), the court 
speaking of rescission as to real estate purchase con-
tract made it clear that a person seeking to disaffirm 
must do it in unequivocal terms and not exercise do-
minion over the property. 
In the instant case the evidence shows no intent 
to repudiate the settlement. First, after Herscovit;-
accepted both drafts, the duress ended. Especially so 
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when he cashed the F & G draft since that eliminated 
the essence of any "wrongdoing" in the theory of 
economic duress. Thereafter, instead of repudiating 
the $12,609.39 payment, he retained it and sought to 
"keep his cake and eat it too." He endorsed and cash-
ed the American draft which can only be judged to be 
an acceptance of the settlement. He could not legally 
negotiate the draft after the duress had terminated 
and claim that the executed release was not binding. 
Further, full consultation with counsel was had be-
fore any action was taken. As a consequence, ratifi-
cation or waiver exists as a matter of law. 
Appellant's reliance on the holding in Purv'is vs. 
Penna. R. Co. 198 F. 2d 631 (3d Cir., 1952) is mis-
placed. A review of the facts in that case demonstrates 
its inapplicability. Plaintiff, a railroad employee was 
injured while working. After recovering from his in-
juries he went to the railroad office to collect back pay. 
It was alleged that while there he signed a release of 
all claims for the injury and also received $45.00. 
Plaintiff believed this represented payment for back 
pay. The check contained release language which the 
plaintiff did not notice or read prior to, or at the time 
of negotiation. The jury found that the plaintiff did 
not sign the release in the railroad office, but the trial 
judg;e held that he was barred from recovery because 
of thr langua,ge of the negotiated check. The appeals 
court reversed this finding holding that there could 
be no ratification of the release in as much as the 
jury found that plaintiff did not even know he had 
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signed a release for his claimed injuries. Plaintiff 
believed the $45 check related to back pay not to his 
mJuries. 
This holding has no relevance to the case at bar 
where Mr. Herscovitz was aware of all the circum-
stances; was aware of the language of the American 
draft and had the advice of counsel before acting. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF FRAUD. 
With reference to appellant's contention that 
the trial court erred in failing to submit the case to 
the jury on the issue of fraud or duress, what here-
tofore has been stated as the position of respondent in 
the previous arguments applies with equal force. 
Appellant had his payment for the inventory loss be-
fore endorsing the American draft; thus, no fraud 
or coercion affected his actions at that time. Addi-
tionally, at the time Mr. Herscovitz executed the 
draft, thus accepting the settlement of the business 
interruption loss, he did so, not on release of Mr. Day's 
statment, but rather acted based on his own investi-
gation. Mr. Herscovitz testified that he was aware 
of his rights even though he accepted the draft ( R 
153, 155). Also, all the evidence shows that Mr. 
Herscovitz was not relying on any statement of Mr. 
Day or Mr. Ball. He was relying upon his own inter-
pretation of the law as well as the advice of his legal 
counsel. 
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It is well settled that reliance is an essential in-
gredient to a cause of action for fraud. The reliance 
must be on the misrepresentation of the defrauding 
party. Pace vs. Parrish, 122 Ut. 141, 247 P 2d 273. 
Prosser, Torts, 3d Ed. pg. 729 notes: 
"In order to be influenced by the repre-
sentation, the plaintiff must of course have 
relied upon it, and believed it to be true. If it 
appears that he knew the facts, or believed the 
statement to be false, or that he was in fact so 
skeptical as to its truth that he reposed no con-
fidence in it, it cannot be regarded as a sub-
stantial cause of his conduct. If, after hearing 
the defendant's words, he makes an investiga-
tion of his own, and acts upon the basis of the 
information so obtained, he may be found not 
to have relied on the defendant, since the fact 
that he was unwilling to accept the statement 
without verification is evidence that he did not 
believe it." (Emphasis added). 
The judgment entered by the trial court express-
ly found that there was no evidence of reliance by 
Herscovitz to his detriment on any representation of 
agents for Western General Agency or General Ad-
justment Bureau ( R 35). 
Appellant, in its brief sets out the necessary ele-
ments to establish fraud. It recognizes the necessity 
of showing reliance as well as other elements. What 
it fails to do is to set forth any evidence which would 
justify a trier of fact in finding that all of these ele-
ments existed in this case. Of particular importance 
is the complete lack of the recitation of any evidence, 
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which established that appellant relied on the state-
ments of Mr. Day. Immediately after the departure 
of Mr. Day and Mr. Ball, Mr. Herscovitz called Mr. 
Holmes. The next day he contacted a lawyer concern-
ing this specific transaction. He gave instructions 
to his bookkeeper regarding the American draft. His 
entire testimony demonstrated a complete lack of be-
lief as to the statement of Mr. Day. 
Not only must there be reliance, but appellant 
must show that he suffered some detriment as a re-
sult of the reliance. This appellant is unable to do. 
The act which precludes any recovery in this action 
is the endorsement of the American draft. As we 
have emphasized repeatedly, this endorsement was 
not the result of any representation, of Mr. Day or 
Mr. Ball. It was endorsed only after collection of the 
F & G draft, only after consultation with counsel and 
was totally unrelated to the alleged happenings of 
June 19, 1961. 
Additionally, as to the GAB the trial court found 
that Mr. Herscovitz, by his own admission, knew that 
it had nothing to do with the payment and that its 
only role was in determining the amount of loss. Ap-
pellant's attempt to impose liability on the GAB on 
the basis of a mumbled assent to Mr. Day's alleged 
statement is a hollow reed, indeed, upon which to im-
pose liability. 
Under all these circumstances we respectfully 
submit that the trial court was absolutely correct in 
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refusing to submit this issue to the jury. The elements 
of fraud were non-existent. 
POINT V 
NO LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED ON AMERI-
CAN, WESTERN OR GAB FOR THERE WAS 
NO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE 
STATEMENTS OF MR. DAY OR MR. BALL 
WERE AUTHORIZED BY THEIR PRINCIPALS 
OR WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR 
NORMAL ACTIVITIES. 
As we have noted previously, appellant chose 
not to sue Mr. Day or Mr. Ball individually and seeks 
to impose liability on American, Western and GAB 
for the alleged statements of Mr. Day or Mr. Ball. 
Thus, it is incumbent upon appellant to establish 
that such conduct was either authorized or within 
the scope of their normal duties. Sweatman vs. Lin-
ton, 66 Ut. 208; 241 P. 309, (1925), 35 Am. Jur. 2d. 
Master and Servant, Sections 550 et seq. This appel-
lant failed to do as to any def end ant. 
First, it is without dispute that the GAB is an 
independent adjusting firm whose only responsibility 
was to determine the amount of the loss. It had no 
control over the payment of the loss, it merely filed 
a report with the company who retained its services. 
The alleged misconduct, if it occurred, related solely 
to the payment of drafts drawn on two insurance 
companies. Clearly, these payments were not within 
the specific authority of Mr. Ball or the GAB, nor 
were they within any apparent authority as Mr. 
Herscovitz well knew. The alleged mumbled assent by 
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Mr. Bell to Mr. Day's statement cannot in anyway 
impose liability on GAB, Western or American. 
Second, there was no evidence that would sup-
port a finding that Mr. Day was authorized by any-
one to withhold delivery of the F & G draft. In fact, 
it was just to the contrary. American would have no 
authority to instruct Mr. Day to withhold delivery of 
a draft drawn on another company. The GAB would 
have no authority nor interest in the payment, or 
non-payment, of either draft, and the only evidence 
was that Western had not instructed Mr. Day to with-
hold payment. (R 257). In this connection, it should 
be noted that appellant originally joined F & G as 
a defendant to this action. Upon motion, F & G was 
dismissed on the grounds that there was no show-
ing that it ever instructed anyone to withhold pay-
ment and this dismissal was affirmed. Reliable Fur-
niture Co. vs. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Un-
derwriters, Inc. ( 1963) 14 Ut. 2d 169, 380 P 2d 135. 
Just as there was no evidence to support a showing 
that F & G authorized such conduct, we submit that 
there was no evidence to show American, Western or 
GAB authorized it either. The conduct, if it occurred, 
was not such as to impose vicarious liability. 
Third, the statements of Mr. Day cannot be at-
tributed to the GAB. Both Western and GAB are in-
dependent of each other with no basis in the record 
for a finding that the acts of Mr. Day can impose lia-
bility upon GAB. Nor can this conduct be attributed 
to American in the absence of alleged. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this instant case gave full lati-
tude to the appellant to present its case in a light that 
would allow it to go to the jury. There was a complete 
absence of evidence which would have supported a 
jury verdict against any of the defendants. Where-
fore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court 
should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX J. HANSON 
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